The general description of these parameters can be found in "PARAMETERS" in EVP_MAC(3). This implementation is identified with this name and properties, to be used with EVP_MAC_fetch(): "CMAC", "provider=default" or "provider=fips" Supported parameters This implementation uses EVP_CIPHER functions to get access to the underlying cipher. Support for computing CMAC MACs through the EVP_MAC API. Printf("-\n") EVP_MAC-CMAC - The CMAC EVP_MAC implementation DESCRIPTION Void xor_128(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b, unsigned char *out) Not intended for use in commercial products. This memo to verify correctness of the algorithm. This C source is designed to generate the test vectors that appear in RFC 4493 The AES-CMAC Algorithm June 2006 Appendix A. Length Messages: The Three-Key Constructions", Journal ofĬryptology, Vol. John Black and Phillip Rogaway, "CBC MACs for Arbitrary. NIST Second Modes of Operation Workshop, August 2001.Īvailable from the NIST modes of operation web site at Handling Arbitrary-Length Messages with the CBC MAC", John Black and Phillip Rogaway, "A Suggestion for Tetsu Iwata and Kaoru Kurosawa, "OMAC: One-Key CBC MAC",įast Software Encryption, FSE 2003, LNCS 2887, pp. Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005. NIST, FIPS 197, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", NIST, Special Publication 800-38B, "Recommendation forīlock Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Technology Alliance (CTA) from US Army Research Laboratory, DAAD19-Ġ1-2-0011 Presidential Award from Army Research Office, W911NF-05-ġ-0491 NSF CAREER ANI-0093187. We acknowledge the support from the following grants: Collaborative Memo was prepared while Tetsu Iwata was at Ibaraki University, Japan. We also thank Alfred Hoenes for many useful comments. WeĪppreciate the OMAC1 authors, the SP 800-38B author, and Russ Housleyįor his useful comments and guidance, which have been incorporated Portions of the text herein are borrowed from. RFC 4493 The AES-CMAC Algorithm June 2006 5. The following table describes the basic definitions necessary to RFC 4493 The AES-CMAC Algorithm June 2006 2. This new authentication algorithm is named AES-CMAC. This memo specifies the authentication algorithm based on CMAC withĪES-128. HMAC is based on a hash function, such as SHA-1, AES-CMAC isĪppropriate for information systems in which AES is more readily Since AES-CMAC is based on a symmetric key block cipher, AES, and Modifications of the data, as well as accidental modifications.ĪES-CMAC achieves a security goal similar to that of HMAC. The data, while CMAC is designed to detect intentional, unauthorized Or an error-detecting code detects only accidental modifications of Of CBC-MAC, and OMAC1 efficiently reduces the key size of XCBC.ĪES-CMAC provides stronger assurance of data integrity than aĬhecksum or an error-detecting code. XCBC efficiently addresses the security deficiencies Improvement of the basic Cipher Block Chaining-Message AuthenticationĬode (CBC-MAC). Submitted by Black and Rogaway, which itself is an Improvement of the eXtended Cipher Block Chaining mode (XCBC) CMAC is equivalent to the One-Key CBC MAC1 (OMAC1) Symmetric key block cipher, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard CMAC is a keyed hash function that is based on a RFC 4493 The AES-CMAC Algorithm June 2006ġ. Purpose of this document is to make the AES-CMAC algorithmĬonveniently available to the Internet Community. This memo specifies an authenticationĪlgorithm based on CMAC with the 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (CMAC), which is equivalent to the One-Key CBC MAC1 (OMAC1) submittedīy Iwata and Kurosawa. Recently specified the Cipher-based Message Authentication Code The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has Distribution of thisĬopyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). Not specify an Internet standard of any kind. This memo provides information for the Internet community. RFC 4493: The AES-CMAC Algorithm Ĭategory: Informational University of Washington
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